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CLASS MATTERS
ERICA J. HASHIMOTO ∗
Poor people constitute one of the most overrepresented categories of
people in the criminal justice system. Why is that so? Unfortunately, we
simply do not know, in large part because we have virtually no information
that could provide an answer. As a result of that informational vacuum,
policymakers either have ignored issues related to economic class, instead
focusing on issues like drug addiction and mental illness as to which there
are more data, or have developed fragmented policies that touch on
economic status issues only tangentially. The bottom line is that without
better data on the profile of poor defendants, coherent policy to address
issues related to economic status simply will not be enacted. Because we
lack data on economic status, we also cannot ascertain whether the system
enforces criminal laws equally or whether it targets poor people. The
inability to prove (or disprove) class discrimination prevents policymakers
from enacting any solutions and leads to mistrust in the system.
This Article highlights the potential beneficial uses of general data on
criminal defendants and data on economic status of criminal defendants in
particular. It goes on to document the data we currently have on income
levels of criminal defendants, and the shortcomings both in our analysis of
that data and in our data collection. Finally, the Article provides a
roadmap for how states and the federal government should collect and
analyze data on the economic status of criminal defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States spends nearly two hundred billion dollars each year
to combat crime. 1 Both because of the amount of money involved and

∗
Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate the very
helpful comments of my colleagues Dan Coenen, Lori Ringhand, and Andrea Dennis. All
errors, of course, are my own.
1
See KRISTEN A. HUGHES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: JUSTICE
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003, at 1 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf (noting that in 2003, the United States
spent $185 billion on police protection, corrections, and judicial and legal activities, an
increase of 418% from the amount spent in 1982).
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because of the importance of this issue, policymakers should rest their
decisions on accurate data so that there is some assurance that the vast
criminal justice budget is being effectively spent. In too many instances,
however, legislators develop policy and laws with little or no information.
Part of the reason that policymakers do not consider data may be that data
are unavailable. In particular, demographic information on defendants in
the system (with the possible exception of information regarding race and
gender) is almost nonexistent. Indeed, one of the most potentially
significant factors—the economic status of the defendant—has been almost
completely ignored.
The data we do have show that poor people become defendants in
criminal cases at a much higher rate than do non-poor people. Without
collecting more data on those defendants—their criminal histories, the
crimes with which they are charged, the outcomes of their cases, their
sentences, and the extent of their overrepresentation in the system—we can
neither generate interest from policymakers in the problems presented by
the sheer volume of poor people in the system nor begin to identify causes
and solutions for this overrepresentation.
Some might argue that collecting more data is not necessary because
everyone knows that the criminal justice system prosecutes more indigent
than non-indigent persons. Without data, however, we do not, and cannot,
know the extent of this disparity and the issue lacks resonance. In this
context, data represent the most powerful, descriptive tool. In addition,
without data, we cannot determine the causes of overrepresentation, so we
cannot develop effective solutions. A very simple (and admittedly oversimplified) example makes the point. If, for instance, the data reveal that
poor defendants commit all types of offenses at a uniformly higher rate than
non-poor defendants, that information may suggest that poor defendants
commit crimes for reasons other than economic need. If that is the case,
any programs targeted at reducing offense rates of poor people need to
recognize that the motivation for the criminal behavior may not be
economic need and may need to incorporate a model of promoting not only
job placement but also community investment and engagement. 2 On the
other hand, if the differential in offense rates between poor and non-poor
defendants does vary depending on the economic nature of the crime, the
message may be that job programs constitute the best tool for countering
criminal activity.
In addition to its importance in developing rational criminal justice
policy, information collection plays a critical role in ensuring even-handed
2
As discussed below, a therapeutic jurisprudence program might be warranted in such a
situation. See infra Part III.B.1.
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administration of our laws. Again, an example illustrates the point. If the
percentage of poor people who are prosecuted for a particular crime—for
instance, drug possession 3—is much greater than the percentage of poor
people who commit the offense, this fact may lead to questions about our
enforcement efforts. Do police target poor people or neighborhoods where
poor people live? Are prosecutors more likely to charge poor people for
drug offenses than wealthy people? The answers to these questions may
well be no, but we cannot know if that is the case unless we collect data. 4
The Article proceeds in three parts. Citing examples, Part II describes
the benefits of collecting and analyzing data on defendants in the criminal
justice system—namely, that data further the development of more rational
criminal justice policy and provide a means of assuring equal enforcement
of the laws. Part III describes the data on economic status that states and
the federal government now collect and the deficiencies in the available
data. It also sets forth the argument that analysis of these data is necessary
both to develop effective criminal justice policy and to ensure that the law
does not discriminate against poor people. Finally, Part IV proposes new
methods of analysis for the existing data and advocates the collection of
more detailed data, particularly at the state level.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING DATA ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
There are two principal reasons we should collect data about
defendants in the criminal justice system. First, data should (although they
often do not) inform policy decisions regarding the definitions of crimes,
the development of programs, and the enactment of sentencing provisions.
After all, regardless of the goals policymakers have for the criminal justice
system—whether crime prevention or retribution or both—they need
information in order to assess whether the money is being spent in the most
cost-effective way to further those goals. If we do not know who is being
prosecuted for crimes, legislators and those working in the criminal justice
system cannot make informed decisions. Second, we cannot have any
assurance that laws are being enforced uniformly—and not on the basis of
unconstitutional or arbitrary factors such as race or gender—unless we
know who is being prosecuted, convicted and punished, and for what.

3

I use drug possession for this example because we have fairly detailed statistics on the
demographic profile of drug users. See infra Part III.B.
4
As discussed below, I recognize that even if the data established unequal enforcement,
there may not be a legal remedy for that inequality. Even without a constitutional remedy,
however, those data still could lead to changes in the enforcement mechanisms. See infra
Part III.B.2.
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A. DATA AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING RATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY

Over the last twenty or thirty years, political considerations generated
by highly publicized cases have significantly affected criminal justice
policy. 5 Indeed, many pieces of legislation creating new crimes and setting
sentences both for new crimes and for existing crimes have been driven by
media coverage of the most high profile cases. Political considerations
generated by media coverage of atypical high-profile cases, however,
provide a poor basis for shaping the criminal justice system. To illustrate
the importance of considering data rather than passing legislation based on
media frenzy, consider Congress’s enactment of legislation that created the
one-hundred-to-one sentencing differential for powder cocaine and crack
cocaine offenses under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 6 The Act
set mandatory minimum penalties for defendants convicted of trafficking
“kingpin” quantities of drugs: one thousand grams of heroin or five
thousand grams of cocaine powder would lead to a ten year mandatory
minimum sentence.7 With respect to crack cocaine,8 Congress established
the “kingpin” level for the mandatory minimum ten-year sentence at fifty
grams, one-hundredth of the amount that would trigger the same mandatory
minimum penalty for powder cocaine.9

5
See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A POLICYMAKER’S
GUIDE TO HATE CRIMES 5 (1997) (“In the area of criminal justice, it is political reality that
public policy sometimes is driven more by emotions and perceptions—sometimes
misperceptions—than hard empirical data.”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 925–26 (2006) (noting that the
public’s view of the criminal justice system is formed on the basis of sensational news
accounts of atypical cases); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 330 (2004) (“American legislators are particularly responsive to public
concerns about crime . . . . The political responsiveness of American criminal justice makes
the input of expertise from social scientists, Sentencing Commission staff, and other
academics or policy analysts less influential.”); Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing and Data:
The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1 (2003) (“On the legislative level,
Congress is infamous for taking dramatic actions concerning sentencing on the spur of the
moment based more on incendiary rhetoric than reason.”) (footnote omitted); William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2558 (2004) (“Every generation has its high-profile crime stories and media frenzies,
which leave behind a trail of new criminal prohibitions.”).
6
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
7
See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1287 (1995).
8
Crack cocaine is made by boiling powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride) with baking
soda. Crack generally is smoked, while powder is sniffed. Id. at 1290–91.
9
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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Much has been written about the reasons Congress settled on the 100:1
ratio for powder and crack cocaine. 10 From those reports, it is clear that
Congress set that ratio without considering any data on either the relative
harmfulness of the drugs at issue 11 or the amounts of these drugs that
“kingpins” ordinarily would traffic.12 The Act itself was passed in record
time, 13 without committee hearings to debate the issues in the bill.14 Instead
of focusing on the science of crack cocaine and data on its usage, debate
centered on congressional concerns about the “crack epidemic” in urban
areas that had been the subject of numerous media stories, 15 including a
high-profile Newsweek article. 16 Much attention also focused on the recent
death of basketball star Len Bias, a University of Maryland standout who
died of a cocaine overdose the night after he was drafted by the Boston
Celtics. 17

10
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing
Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 20–21 (2007); Sklansky,
supra note 7, at 1290–97.
11
See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 409 (1995) (noting that the Subcommittee on Crime “did not
determine the relative harmfulness of different drugs”).
12
As Professor Sklansky observes, there really is no such thing as a “kingpin” crack
trafficker because “[a]s Congress appears to have recognized, large-volume drug traffickers
generally do not deal in crack; they deal in its precursor, powder cocaine. Defendants caught
trafficking in crack thus are almost always the street-level retailers of the cocaine trade, not
the wholesalers.” Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1288 (citation omitted).
13
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 117 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_
Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/199502_RtC_Cocaine
_Sentencing_Policy/chap5-8.pdf [hereinafter USSC REPORT] (“Apparently because of the
heightened concern [over crack], Congress dispensed with much of the typical deliberative
legislative process, including committee hearings.”).
14
See Sterling, supra note 11, at 408–09 (noting that the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Crime completed all of its work on the bill in just five weeks, and that much of the usual
procedure was “circumvented” for this bill).
15
See USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 122 (“Some assertions made in these [media]
reports were not supported by data at the time and in retrospect were simply incorrect. One
report in 1986, for example, labeled crack cocaine as ‘America’s drug of choice.’ . . . The
first statistics on crack cocaine use compiled by NIDA subsequent to the report showed that
snorting powder cocaine was still the preferred method of ingestion by 95 percent of cocaine
users.”) (internal citations omitted).
16
See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1294.
17
See, e.g., USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 122–23; Sterling, supra note 11, at 408
(describing the compressed time frame for consideration of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 following Bias’s death of a purported cocaine overdose); Michael Tonry, Rethinking
Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1787 (1999).
Interestingly, although the media initially reported that Bias had died of crack overdose, it
turned out that Bias had snorted powder cocaine. USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 123.
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Congress’s failure to consider any scientific or usage data before
passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and in particular before adopting
the 100:1 ratio, has had negative consequences for federal drug policy.
First, the Act has been used primarily to prosecute minor street-level retail
sellers of crack cocaine, rather than wholesale sellers of drugs, completely
undermining the purpose of the Act. 18 To put it another way, the resources
that Congress intended to allocate to combat large-scale drug traffickers
instead were diverted to prosecuting and incarcerating street-level dealers.
Second, as discussed below, the focus on prosecuting street-level retailers
of crack cocaine, combined with the severe penalties for those convicted
under the Act, has led to the mass incarceration of young, AfricanAmerican men. 19
The history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 illustrates the dangers
of making criminal law policy in the absence of sound data. Fortunately,
there are also numerous examples of legislators and policymakers collecting
and using data to develop criminal justice policy. Sentencing guidelines
legislation provides one example, 20 and the developments of drug courts
and of mental health courts provide two more. The data used in
formulating these programs are far from perfect and certainly have been
subject to criticism. Nonetheless, these reforms demonstrate the benefits
both of considering data in the development of criminal justice policy and
of creating mechanisms to collect data in order to assess the effectiveness of
those policies over time.
1. Sentencing Guidelines
Through the late 1970s and 1980s, a number of states developed
sentencing guidelines that were designed to curb sentencing discretion of
judges. Although the development of guidelines varied across jurisdictions,
data played a critical role both in the initial creation of guidelines systems
and in monitoring their impact. Concerns about lack of sentencing
uniformity and problems with prison overcrowding spurred sentencing

18

See USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 158 (reporting that 59.6% of crack cocaine
defendants in federal prisons were street-level retailers).
19
See infra Part II.B.
20
See, e.g., Chanenson, supra note 5, at 12 (“[T]he necessity of sentencing data should
be virtually self-evident. How else can we hope to know if what we are attempting to do
through both sentencing policy and individual sentencing decisions is actually working?”);
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, “The Wisdom We Have Lost”: Sentencing Information
and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 377–78 (2005) (arguing that although we now have
significantly more data on sentencing than we did thirty-five years ago, that data still is
incomplete).
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reform. 21 Believing that finding solutions to both of these problems
required collection and consideration of information related to sentencing
practices, drafters of guidelines in at least some states used data to set initial
guidelines ranges. Perhaps more importantly, sentencing commissions
collected extensive data on the implementation of the guidelines in order to
ensure that they were meeting their statutory goals. 22
Minnesota, the first state to develop sentencing guidelines, provides a
telling example. In 1978, the state legislature established the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission and directed the commission to develop
sentencing guidelines. 23 The legislature instructed the commission, when
developing and amending the guidelines, to consider “capacity
constraint”—the relationship between the severity of prison sentences and
the space available to house prisoners—among other factors. 24 Focusing on
the capacity constraint goal, the commission developed a detailed computer
model to project expected prison populations that would result from
different variations of proposed guidelines.25 The commission also began
collecting data almost immediately after its formation and has continued to
collect data on sentencing in Minnesota ever since.26 Relying on this
information, Minnesota authorities have crafted changes to the guidelines
over time, including amendments that reduced the durations of prison
sentences for some offenses because the data showed that Minnesota was
approaching its prison capacity. 27
The data collected by the commission, along with the legislature’s
directives concerning relevant factors for sentencing, have resulted in a
much more coherent overall sentencing policy than had previously
existed. 28 In particular, because of the commission’s focus on considering
21

See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, 32 CRIME
& JUST. 131, 132 (2005) (noting Minnesota’s legislative goals of reducing “disparity in the
treatment of similarly situated offenders” and “coordinat[ing] sentencing policy with
available correctional resources, especially prison and jail capacities”).
22
See Chanenson, supra note 5, at 1 (“Legislatures and sentencing commissions can and
do use data to craft and improve sentencing policy on a systemic level.”).
23
See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF
MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 28 (1988).
24
Id. at 51.
25
See Frase, supra note 21, at 147.
26
See Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The
Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 279 n.2
(1992) (observing that the Minnesota commission has “routinely collected a large amount of
data on all felony sentences” giving rise to a “rich source of data and commentary”).
27
See id. at 286.
28
Minnesota’s policy decisions have been the subject of at least some criticism, but
regardless whether one agrees with those policy choices, the overall sentencing scheme
appears to have advanced those goals. See Frase, supra note 21, at 136–37.
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capacity constraints in developing and modifying the guidelines,
Minnesota, at least through the 1980s, managed to reserve its prison space
for the most serious offenders thereby avoiding the prison overcrowding
problems that plagued the rest of the country. 29 In 1979, the nationwide
incarceration rate for state prisoners was 126 per 100,000 people.30 By
1990, the nationwide rate had more than doubled to 272 per 100,000
people, 31 and prison systems throughout the country were struggling with
prison overcrowding issues. In large part because of the effect of the
guidelines, the incarceration rate in Minnesota during that same period did
not rise nearly as significantly. In 1979, the year before the Minnesota
guidelines went into effect, the incarceration rate in Minnesota was 51 per
100,000 people, and by 1990, it had risen only to 72 per 100,000 people.32
Perhaps most importantly, because Minnesota had carefully considered how
the limited prison resources should be allocated, it did not run out of space
as other state prison systems did.
Since 1990, incarceration rates in Minnesota have increased much
more significantly, but primarily as a result of factors beyond the
commission’s control. Two factors have radically affected incarceration
rates in Minnesota.33 First, the number of defendants prosecuted and
sentenced has increased significantly, at least in part due to the increased
number of defendants sentenced for drug crimes. 34 Second, the Minnesota
legislature, like Congress and state legislatures across the country, has
increased the number of crimes that carry with them mandatory minimum
sentences. 35 Thus, as one commentator notes, although sentencing policy
“under the guidelines has become much more data driven, comprehensive,
and consistent . . . it has only been partially insulated from political

29

See Frase, supra note 26, at 334 (concluding that because of the sentencing guidelines,
Minnesota through the 1980s “manag[ed] to avoid the serious problems of prison and jail
overcrowding (and court intervention) which have become the norm in most states”).
30
See PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INCARCERATION RATES FOR PRISONERS UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION, PER 100,000
RESIDENTS (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2040.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
The Minnesota guidelines, like the sentencing guidelines in many states, also have
been affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2003), holding that Washington’s sentencing guideline system was unconstitutional because
it required the court to sentence the defendant for conduct not proven to a jury. The effects
of Blakely on incarceration rates, however, are not yet clear.
34
See Frase, supra note 21, at 136 (noting that in the period from 1981 through 2002, the
total number of felons sentenced for drug crimes per year more than quadrupled, resulting in
a doubling of the total number of felons sentenced per year).
35
See id. at 159–62.
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pressure.” 36 Data have not completed solved the problem of politics and
sentencing policy in Minnesota, but the experience with the guidelines
suggests that data in the hands of policymakers—here the sentencing
commission—can lead to much more coherent and effective criminal justice
policy.
2. Drug Courts
Another example of the use of data to influence criminal justice policy
has come in the area of drug courts, which provide intensive and courtmonitored treatment to defendants whose involvement in the criminal
justice system is primarily attributable to their drug addiction. 37 Drug
courts have developed over the past twenty years primarily through the
initiative of local courts, with the help of state and local legislation and
assistance from Congress. Reform legislation has been the direct result of
data documenting the extent of drug use among those charged with criminal
offenses and data evaluating the success of the drug court approach.
The court system in Miami–Dade County created the first drug
treatment court in 1989.38 The effort was motivated both by concerns about
prison overcrowding 39 spawned by increases in drug-related prosecutions
and penalties, 40 and by the concerns of those who worked within the

36

Id. at 137.
This is a very broad definition, but a more detailed definition is not possible because
there is significant variation among drug court programs. See RYAN S. KING & JILL
PASQUARELLA, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 2 (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_drugcourts.pdf (“Because drug courts are designed
and operated at the local level, there are fundamental differences . . . .”). One point of
clarification regarding the use of the term “drug court” is, however, in order. This Article
uses the term “drug court” to refer to drug treatment courts modeled after the Miami–Dade
County drug treatment court described below. The term drug court has also been used to
refer to courts that implemented programs to “fast-track” drug possession cases. See Richard
C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1205, 1207 (1998). However, this Article uses the term only to include drug treatment
courts.
38
John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 942 (2000) (“[K]ey Miami justice leaders in 1989, such as
Chief Judge Gerald Wetherington, Judge Herbert Klein, Dade County’s State Attorney Janet
Reno, Public Defender Bennet Brummer, and Timothy Murray (the Office of Substance and
Abuse Control Director), improvised by using drug courts to respond to a crisis in the
criminal justice system.”).
39
In 1988, the prison population in two-thirds of the states exceeded their maximum
prison capacity. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1988, at 5 (1989).
40
See Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological
Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265,
269 (2006) (describing the “massive influx of prisoners” in the late 1970s and early 1980s as
37
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criminal justice system that prison sentences were not solving the drug
problem. 41 The original concept was to involve defendants in drug
treatment programs with hands-on oversight by judges assigned to their
cases as a key part of the resolution of the criminal charges. 42 Although the
idea of a drug treatment court initially met with “embarrassed silence and
out-of-hand dismissal,” 43 in the ensuing twenty years, drug courts have
become commonplace. In 2009, 2,038 drug courts were operating across
the country, in 1,416 of the 3,155 counties in the country. 44 Moreover, as of
2007, forty-one states had enacted legislation related to the planning,
operation, or funding of drug courts. 45
The tremendous growth in the number of drug courts is attributable to
two data-driven factors. First, these courts have made a concerted effort,
supported by the federal government, to evaluate the effectiveness of the
programs they operate—both in terms of reducing recidivism 46 and in terms
of cutting prison and jail costs 47—and at least some of those assessments

“unprecedented”); Franklin E. Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal Sanction, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 809, 809 (1993).
41
See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal
Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
439, 448–49 (1999) (“The emergence of [drug courts] reflects the growing recognition on
the part of judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel that the traditional criminal justice
methods of incarceration, probation, or supervised parole have not stemmed the tide of drug
use among criminals and drug-related crimes in America.”).
42
See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 936.
43
Id. at 927.
44
See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY STATE AND COUNTY (2009), available at
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2150.pdf.
45
See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DRUG
COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE 114 (2007), available at http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/
documents/2105.pdf.
46
See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE 2–3 (May 1997), available at
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2079.pdf (reporting that “[m]ost criminal
justice system professionals estimate that at least 45% of defendants convicted of drug
possession will recidivate with a similar offense within two to three years,” but “[i]n
comparison . . . recidivism among all drug court participants has ranged between five percent
to twenty-eight percent and less than four percent for graduates [of the drug court
program]”). But see Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary: The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 1437, 1479–80 (2000) (arguing that there is no real empirical evidence that drug courts
reduce recidivism among all participants).
47
See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
MEMORANDUM RE: COST BENEFITS/COSTS AVOIDED REPORTED BY DRUG COURT PROGRAMS
AND DRUG COURT PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORTS 2–3 (Apr. 10, 2009), available at
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2526.pdf (noting that jurisdictions with
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report positive outcomes. As more and more jurisdictions have struggled
both with jail overcrowding and with recidivism, the existence of these
reports has made drug courts an increasingly attractive option.
Second, the federal government has funded both implementation of
drug courts and assessment of these programs. In 1994, Congress passed
legislation providing funding for a new Drug Court Program Office within
the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice designed to
provide technical assistance to drug court programs, and it also appropriated
twelve million dollars to support the development and assessment of those
programs. 48 By 2002, this program had grown to the point that the
Department of Justice awarded ninety-four grants totaling $34.19 million. 49
In addition to awarding money, participation by the Department of Justice
has been critical to fostering assessment of drug court outcomes. In 1997,
the Department sponsored an initiative by the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals, which developed a list of the ten necessary elements
for a successful drug court program. 50 The Department also has sponsored
a clearinghouse to maintain all of the data related to drug court programs
across the country. 51
The widespread implementation of drug courts has not escaped
criticism both by academics and by lawyers who represent defendants in the
drug court system. In particular, some have argued that drug courts’ claims
of success have been somewhat (if not completely) overstated and that there
is no empirical evidence that drug courts actually reduce recidivism. 52 Part
drug court programs reported in 2001 that the program saved them an average of 10,133
prison/jail days or $667,694).
48
See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 948. Then-Attorney General Janet Reno, who had
been instrumental in creating the first drug court in Miami–Dade County, played a critical
role in the Department of Justice’s support of drug courts.
49
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS DRUG COURTS
GRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 2002,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/DrugCourts/02DCgrants.htm.
50
See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 936.
51
The clearinghouse is operated by American University’s School of Public Affairs in
conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance. See Drug Court
Clearinghouse/Adult Technical Assistance Project, AM. UNIV. JUST. PROGRAMS OFFICE,
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/project.php?ID=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
52
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1479–80 (“Perhaps the most startling thing about
the drug court phenomenon is that drug courts have so quickly become fixtures of our
jurisprudence in the absence of satisfying empirical evidence that they actually work.”).
Some academics also have criticized the non-adversarial nature of drug court programs,
suggesting that the nature of the program can infringe on the defendant’s constitutional
rights or force defense counsel to abandon the role of zealous advocate. See, e.g., Tamar M.
Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of
a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“The standard
premise behind [treatment] courts is the emasculation of the traditional role of the criminal
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of the dispute over the success of drug court programs stems from
differences in how to measure success. In particular, in determining
whether drug courts reduce recidivism rates, some examine the recidivism
rates of drug court graduates, 53 while others argue that the relevant group
for study is those who participate in the drug court program (which would
include drug court dropouts).54 Because the recidivism rates of graduates
are so much lower than those of dropouts (indeed, most studies demonstrate
that drug courts reduce recidivism of graduates), 55 any assessment of the
success of the program depends on the group being tracked.
That having been said, the dispute over how to measure the success of
the program demonstrates the value of having collected this data. As a
result of the data collection, we now know that drug courts have a much
greater impact on those who graduate than on those who do not finish, so
that programs should focus on ways to lower the dropout rates. 56 Whether
or not one concludes that drug courts solve the problems they were intended
to address, the fact that we now have data to measure their success and
improve their outcomes sets them apart from the vast majority of criminal
justice programs. 57
3. Mental Health Courts
Mental health courts arose out of the same therapeutic justice
movement that created drug courts, 58 and as was the case with drug courts,
defender as a zealous advocate fighting against the system.”); Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to
Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense
Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539
(2007). While these arguments have force, for purposes of this Article, I am more concerned
with the empirical questions surrounding drug courts than the constitutional questions.
53
See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the TwentyFirst Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV.
717, 801–03 (2008) (citing statistics suggesting that nationally, drug court graduates have
significantly lower recidivism rates than defendants convicted of drug offenses who have not
participated in a drug court program).
54
See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1483 (“[M]ost evaluators now agree that the most
meaningful target group against which the control group must be compared is all drug court
defendants, not just drug court graduates.”).
55
KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 37, at 7 (“[D]rug court participants who graduate
tend to have much lower recidivism rates than drug court dropouts.”).
56
See id. (“[The fact that dropouts have a higher recidivism rate than graduates] suggests
that drug courts experiencing a less than desired effect on rearrest rates may want to focus on
addressing the program design to encourage higher rates of retention.”).
57
See Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, 51 ADVOC.: OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION IDAHO ST. B. 14, 14 (Sept. 2008) (arguing that “[f]ew, if any, other criminal
justice programs have been put to” the same level of scientific scrutiny as drug courts).
58
Drug courts were the first of the so-called problem-solving courts, and mental health
courts, like drug courts, attempt to solve the root causes of the defendant’s perpetration of
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data have fostered their development. The first mental health court was
founded in 1997, nearly a decade after the first drug court, and it was
designed to provide treatment and resources for defendants who had
become involved in the criminal justice system primarily because of mental
illness. 59 Because of the similarities in design and inception, the path of
mental health courts has been remarkably similar to that of drug courts.
Like drug courts, mental health courts have multiplied rapidly—
although not nearly as rapidly as drug treatment courts 60—and much of the
same pattern of growth has marked their evolution. First, although mental
health courts use the same general approach to the problem—namely the
provision of mental health treatment enforced by the threat of court
sanctions—courts have adapted the model depending on the needs of
particular jurisdictions. 61 This fine-tuning has meant that jurisdictions
seeking to develop mental health courts have had to study the mental illness
problem in their localities and the varying models to determine which
model will work most effectively.
Second, the growth of mental health courts has largely been the result
of cooperation among localities, states, and the federal government. That
cooperation, in turn, was driven by data establishing the scope of the
problem of mentally ill defendants in the criminal justice system. In 2000,
Congress passed America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project. 62
The Act authorized ten million dollars per year for fiscal years 2001
through 2004, to support state or local courts in establishing and running
mental health courts. The debates over the Act, as well as the findings
contained within the Act, were dominated by data on the prevalence of
mental illness among defendants in the criminal justice system. 63 In
introducing the bill in the Senate, for example, Senator Mike DeWine of
the crime. See BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 3–5 (2003).
59
See Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114,
1168, 1170 (2008).
60
As of 2009, a dozen years after the first mental health court opened, there were more
than 250 mental health courts in this country. See LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD,
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 2
(2009), available at http://consensusproject.org/jc_publications/mental-health-courts-aguide-to-research-informed-policy-and-practice/Mental_Health_Court_Research_Guide.pdf.
61
See Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 826–32
(2004).
62
See America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114
Stat. 2399 (2000).
63
See id. at § 2 (setting forth findings, including data from a Bureau of Justice Statistics
report that 16% of all inmates in state prisons and local jails suffer from mental illness, and
that 75% of mentally ill inmates had at least one prior conviction).
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Ohio highlighted both nationwide statistics establishing that a high
percentage of defendants in state prisons and local jails are mentally ill and
recidivate at a high level, and statistics from individual states and localities
demonstrating high rates of mental illness.64 Similarly, virtually all of the
representatives who spoke in support of the bill in the House of
Representatives cited data on mentally ill defendants gathered by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics and private groups.65
As a result of the funding and assistance provided by states 66 and the
federal government, since the passage of America’s Law Enforcement and
Mental Health Project in 2000, 67 mental health courts have expanded
steadily. By 2005, there were 125 mental health courts operating in
counties across the country, a number of which received funding from the
Bureau of Justice Assistance to help cover the start-up costs, 68 and between
2004 and 2009, the number of mental health courts doubled to 250. 69
Most importantly, the cooperative efforts of federal, state, and local
government agencies have led to the development of research on what does
and does not work in mental health court operation. 70 As with drug courts,
mental health courts have raised concerns as to fairness and effectiveness.71

64

See 145 Cong. Rec. S13972-02, S13983 (1999).
See 146 Cong. Rec. H10636-01, H10637-39 (2000).
66
In addition to the funding provided by the federal government, some states also have
set up agencies to support the planning and implementation of mental health courts. See
Kirk Kimber, Mental Health Courts—Idaho’s Best Kept Secret, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 249, 253–
54 (2008) (describing the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act, which sets forth
the legislature’s intent to support drug courts and mental health courts).
67
Additional funding, beyond 2004, was approved with the passage of the Mentally Ill
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327
(2004). That Act authorized funding of up to $50 million per year for fiscal year 2005 and
such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006–09.
68
See Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 1170.
69
See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 60, at 7–8. Between 2002 and 2003, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance provided funding to thirty-seven mental health courts, but between 2006
and 2009, it provided funding for an additional seventy-four mental health courts. See Email from Ruby Qazilbash, Senior Policy Advisor for Substance Abuse and Mental Health,
Bureau of Justice Assistance, to Professor Erica J. Hashimoto, University of Georgia School
of Law (March 15, 2010) (on file with author).
70
See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 60, at 21–28 (discussing the state of the research,
and suggesting further questions about mental health courts for research and data collection);
HENRY J. STEADMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, A GUIDE TO COLLECTING MENTAL
HEALTH COURT OUTCOME DATA 3 (2005) (soliciting data from mental health court providers
and noting that “[t]he core question in evaluating mental health courts is not, ‘Do mental
health courts work?’ but rather, ‘What works, for whom, under what circumstances?’”).
71
See id. (noting the concern of some criminal justice and mental health experts that
mental health courts work primarily with low-level offenders who otherwise would have
received either dismissal or minimal punishment, and mental health court participants
65
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But the fact that they continue to be the subject of so much study means that
it is likely they will develop and address those criticisms over time. 72
B. ENSURING FAIR AND EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL
STATUTES

The three examples discussed above demonstrate that data can lead to
sound decisions in the enactment, implementation, and evaluation of
criminal justice policies. In addition to its importance for the development
of rational criminal justice policy, data collection also must be undertaken
in order to ensure even-handed enforcement of statutes.
Race
discrimination provides an illustrative example. Allegations of race
discrimination at all levels have dogged the criminal justice system since at
least the 1970s. 73 But without the collection of data, including data broken
down by the race of defendants, one can neither assess whether people of
color are being prosecuted and convicted at higher rates than are whites,
nor, even if one could show that disproportionate numbers of African
Americans were being prosecuted, substantiate claims that race
discrimination played a role in the unequal prosecution.
Before turning to the ways in which data can be used to assure equal
enforcement, it is helpful to understand the types of data that currently are
available. Collecting data on the race of defendants in the criminal justice
system is a practice of relatively recent vintage, and although the data
remain incomplete, there is much more statistical information on race now
than there was twenty years ago. In the federal courts, a variety of
agencies—including the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys in the
Department of Justice, the Pretrial Services Agency, the United States
Marshals Service, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
United States Sentencing Commission, and the Bureau of Prisons—collect
therefore may end up under court supervision longer than they would have been with
traditional court adjudication).
72
Id. at 3 (“Mental health courts are better known and more studied than any other courtbased initiative focused on mental health.”).
73
See, e.g., CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993)
(documenting evidence of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity in the criminal
justice system); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black
Disruption or Despair?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 165 (1973); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16 (1998) (asserting
that “[a]t every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that African Americans are not
treated as well as whites—both as victims of crime and as criminal defendants,” and
recommending that legislatures require prosecutors to complete “racial impact studies”
containing data on the race of the defendant and victim in each case and actions taken at
each step in the process); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (documenting evidence that white jurors are more likely to
convict black defendants than white defendants).
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data on persons prosecuted in the federal criminal justice system. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics compiles the data and makes it available
through the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center. 74
As set forth in Table 1, data on the race of federal defendants (or
suspects) have been collected by the Pretrial Services Agency of the
Courts, 75 the United States Sentencing Commission, 76 the Bureau of
Prisons, 77 and the United States Marshals Service 78 since 1987. Neither the
Administrative Office of the Courts 79 nor the Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys, 80 however, collects data of this kind.
At a practical level, this means that data related to race and sentencing
are available (both from the Sentencing Commission and, if the defendant is

74

See About the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/index.cfm?p=about_fjsp (last
visited Nov. 4, 2010).
75
The U.S. Courts Pretrial Services Act Information System collects and records a
wealth of data on defendants in federal court, including the defendant’s gender, race, age,
Hispanic origin, employment status at arrest, education level, criminal history, criminal
justice status (i.e., whether the defendant was on parole, probation, or pretrial release at the
time of arrest), history of drug abuse, and whether the defendant was released. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.3.2
(2009),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.cfm
[hereinafter 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES].
76
The U.S. Sentencing Commission collects data on every criminal defendant sentenced
in federal court. Each line of data includes a wealth of information not only about the case,
including the charge(s), the method of adjudication, and the sentence imposed, but also about
the defendant, including race, gender, age, education level, criminal history, and citizenship.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.4–9
(2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC 08.htm.
77
The Bureau of Prisons collects data on all federal defendants who are sentenced to
incarceration and confined within the Bureau of Prisons’ system. Data on inmates includes
race, age, gender, citizenship, and whether the inmate is of Hispanic origin. See 2006
STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 75, at tbl.7.10.
78
The U.S. Marshals Service collects data on all suspects it arrests. The data includes
the gender, race, age, and citizenship of the suspect. See 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES, supra
note 75, at tbl.1.3.
79
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts keeps data on all criminal defendants
processed through the federal courts. Most of the data are case-related, including the types
of charges, the outcome of the case, and the method of adjudication. The database keeps
very little data on defendants and does not keep data on the race of defendants. See FED.
JUSTICE STATISTICS RES. CTR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA DICTIONARY FOR
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED, available at http://fjsrc.urban.org/
datadictionary.cfm (describing all of the data variables collected by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts).
80
The Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys collects data on all suspects investigated
by the United States Attorney’s Office, including the investigating agency, the nature of any
charges filed, and the outcome, but it does not collect any data on the race or gender of the
suspect. See id.
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Table 1
Data Collection by Federal Agencies
Agency

People Included
in Data
Collection

Types of
Information
Collected

Collect Data
on Race?

Executive
Office for U.S.
Attorneys

Suspects
Investigated

Investigating
agency, whether
charged, and
outcome

No

Pretrial
Services
Agency

Defendants in
federal court

Information related
to pretrial release

Yes

United States
Marshal’s
Service

Suspects arrested
and booked

Information related
to suspect

Yes

Defendants in
federal court

Case-related data,
including type and
method of
adjudication

No

United States
Sentencing
Comm.

Defendants
convicted and
sentenced

Information
regarding charge,
adjudication, and
sentencing-related
factors

Yes

Bureau of
Prisons

Defendants
sentenced to
prison

Information related
to prisoners

Yes

Administrative
Office of the
Courts

sentenced to a term of imprisonment, from the Bureau of Prisons), as are
data on race and arrest (from the U.S. Marshals Service), and on race and
pretrial release (from the U.S. Courts Pretrial Services System). Because
neither the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys nor the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts collects data on race of defendants or suspects
investigated, 81 however, data on race and adjudicatory outcomes and data
on race and the decision to prosecute simply do not exist. While this leaves

81

See Email from Thomas H. Cohen, Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics, to
Professor Erica J. Hashimoto, University of Georgia School of Law (Mar. 9, 2010) (on file
with author).
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a serious gap in the data, because a high percentage of defendants in federal
court are convicted either by way of trial or by guilty plea, the Sentencing
Commission’s data still provide a relatively complete profile of those
persons prosecuted in the federal courts.
In state courts, where the vast majority of criminal defendants are
prosecuted, the collection of data on criminal defendants varies widely
depending on the jurisdiction. Since 1988, the federal Bureau of Justice
Statistics has collected data from pretrial services agencies on a sample of
felony defendants in forty of the largest seventy-five counties in the
country. 82 These data include the types and number of charges, the pretrial
release status of the defendant, the criminal history of the defendant, the
age, race, and sex of the defendant, the outcome of the case, and the
sentence. 83 The dataset did not originally include data on the race of the
defendant, but this information has been collected since 1990. The primary
problem with this dataset is that it collects data only in the most populous
counties and only on defendants charged with felonies. Thus, there are no
data from smaller jurisdictions or rural areas or for misdemeanor
defendants.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also collects data on felony sentencing
from individual states (or counties if the data are kept by counties) through
the National Judicial Reporting Program. 84 The database contains extensive
information on the criminal history, race, gender, ethnicity, and age of the
defendant, along with information about the method of conviction, the type
of charges, and the sentence imposed.85
Some individual states, in particular states that have sentencing
commissions, collect and make available sentencing data on defendants in
their criminal justice systems. 86 In most states, the department of
corrections also compiles demographic information on inmates in the state
82

See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1990–2006 Cumulative Codebook, in STATE
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990–2006: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES 4 (2007), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2038/
documentation.
83
See id.
84
See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN: FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf.
85
See id.
86
See, e.g., TAMARA FLINCHUM ET AL., N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY
COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS
FISCAL YEAR 2007/08, at 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.nccourts.org/
Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/07-08statisticalreportR.pdf (listing convictions by
age, race, and gender of defendant); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING
PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2009
(2010), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/sentencing_practices.htm.
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prison system, at least as to race, age and gender. 87 In addition, in
Minnesota, court clerks ask criminal defendants to complete a questionnaire
requesting information on gender, race, and ethnicity. 88 The clerks then
forward those forms to statisticians for analysis. 89 With the exception of
Minnesota, however, states do not appear to be collecting data on criminal
defendants except as it relates to sentencing or corrections. 90
While the data admittedly remain incomplete, those concerned about
issues of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system have used the
existing data to assess the extent to which the laws operate impartially. In
addition, criminal defendants have used the data to try to prove claims of
race discrimination. While equal protection claims have rarely succeeded
in courts, 91 at the very least the statistics on race do appear to have
influenced legislative debates. 92
1. The Use of Data to Prove Equal Protection Violations
Criminal defendants’ claims that they have been unconstitutionally
singled out for prosecution or punishment have not fared well in the courts.
In spite of that fact, collecting data on race remains critically important
because, as the Supreme Court’s selective prosecution cases make clear,
without data, a defendant cannot prevail on a selective prosecution claim.
Thus, while such claims continue to be very difficult to prove even with
data, it is possible that more sophisticated data collection may ultimately
make the claims more readily provable.93
The Court has recognized that, while the government retains “broad
discretion as to whom to prosecute . . . the decision to prosecute may not be
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
87

See, e.g., GA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT FY 08, at 17 (2009), available at
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Reports/Annual/pdf/FY08_Annual_Report.pdf.
Some
jurisdictions keep much more detailed information. For instance, in addition to collecting
data on gender, race, and sex, the Massachusetts Department of Corrections collects data on
the marital status, citizenship, religion, and educational level of inmates. See MASS. DEP’T
OF CORR., JANUARY 1, 2009 INMATE STATISTICS tbls.17–22 (2009) available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/research_reports/112009.pdf.
88
See Jon B. Gould, Studying Inequality with One Eye: A New Agenda for Evaluating
Disparate Treatment in the Courts, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 317, 325 (2002).
89
See id.
90
See id. at 321 (concluding that except the studies relating to sentencing, “[b]y and
large, the courts lack similar analyses of judicial verdicts, whether they are criminal findings
of guilt or civil judgments of liability”).
91
See infra Part II.B.1.
92
See infra Part II.B.2.
93
See Gould, supra note 88, at 321 (arguing that courts should collect more data so that
litigants can assess whether disparate outcomes exist, and if they do, analyze the reasons for
those disparate outcomes).
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Most scholars date the “selective
other arbitrary classification.” 94
prosecution” prohibition to 1886, when the Supreme Court held in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 95 that California violated the Equal Protection Clause when it
treated people of Chinese descent differently when enforcing an ordinance
than it treated white people.96 Yick Wo held that the Equal Protection
Clause protects against the discriminatory enforcement of a facially neutral
statute, while leaving open what a defendant must show in order to prevail
on a selective prosecution claim.
Nearly a century later, the Court answered that question, holding that a
defendant alleging discriminatorily selective prosecution of a facially
neutral statute in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate
both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. 97 While the Court
has intimated that statistical proof demonstrating a “stark” pattern may be
sufficient to establish discriminatory intent, 98 the Court has set a very high
threshold for using statistical proof in this way. In McCleskey v. Kemp, for
instance, the defendant relied on the Baldus study, a detailed statistical
analysis that showed that African Americans who were charged with and
convicted of killing white people in Georgia (as McCleskey was) had a
statistically significantly higher likelihood of being sentenced to death
compared to both white people who killed white people and African

94

See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
96
See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 159 (1999) (“[T]he principle the court
established in Yick Wo is straightforward: where the government discriminates based on race
in its enforcement of the criminal law, it denies equal protection.”). The petitioner in Yick
Wo was convicted of violating a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited operating a laundry
in a wooden building without the permission of the Board of Supervisors. Yick Wo, 118 U.S.
at 374. The undisputed record established that 200 laundry owners of Chinese descent
applied for such permits and all were denied, while eighty-one white laundry owners applied
for permits and all but one were granted the permits. Id. At least one scholar has concluded
that because Yick Wo “was not fundamentally a criminal case,” i.e., the discrimination was
perpetrated by civil authorities—the Board of Supervisors—rather than by prosecutors, it
does not recognize the selective prosecution doctrine for which it is so often cited. See
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1359, 1363 (2008). Regardless whether the doctrine originated with Yick Wo or in later
cases, it indisputably now exists.
97
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608–09; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1968).
98
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–94 (1987) (citing Yick Wo for the
proposition that “statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as
the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution”). But see United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (suggesting that in order to prevail on a selective
prosecution claim, a defendant must provide evidence that a similarly situated person of a
different race was treated differently).
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Americans who killed African Americans.99 The Court concluded that
“[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would
demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion
has been abused,” and it therefore held that “the Baldus study is clearly
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in
McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.” 100
In the wake of McCleskey, the challenge facing defendants trying to
establish selective prosecution claims has only become more difficult. In
United States v. Armstrong, the Court held that defendants in federal court
are not entitled to discovery to prove selective prosecution claims unless
they first come forward with some evidence that “similarly situated
defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.” 101
The decisions in McCleskey and Armstrong highlight the importance of
collecting data on the race of defendants because, without such data, a
defendant cannot even begin to establish a selective prosecution claim. 102
Indeed, even with the data that are now being collected, selective
prosecution claims remain virtually (if not completely) impossible to
prove. 103 Thus, court systems ought to expand the data being collected in
order to ensure that the Constitution is being respected.104

99

As the Court described the study, it concluded that

even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks. According to this model, black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death
sentence as other defendants. Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as
McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. The defendant also argued that the study established that the
death penalty in Georgia violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected that
argument as well. Id. at 313.
100
Id. at 297.
101
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
102
This is particularly so since Armstrong so severely limits the discovery to which
defendants are constitutionally entitled.
103
See COLE, supra note 96, at 159 (concluding that there were “no reported federal or
state cases since 1886 that had dismissed a criminal prosecution on the ground that the
prosecutor acted for racial reasons”); Chin, supra note 96, at 1361 n.11 (“It is always
dangerous to make claims that there are ‘no reported cases’ on a question of law, but my
research assistant and I looked, and we, like many other researchers, could find none.”).
104
Some argue that court systems are understandably reluctant to keep data on race of
defendants both because the data can be misused to reinforce stereotypes about African
Americans and because there is a lack of consensus about the racial classifications
themselves. See Paul Knepper, Race, Racism, and Crime Statistics, 24 S.U. L. REV. 71, 72–
73 (1996). Although those arguments have force, I think the potential benefits flowing from
the collection of data—namely, ensuring the fairness of the criminal justice system—
outweigh those concerns.
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2. Use of Data on Race in the Legislative Process
Although data on race have not yet led to systemic reform through the
Equal Protection Clause, they have proven useful in the legislative arena in
two ways. First, although many African Americans perceive the criminal
justice system as unfair, 105 legislators and those who work within the
system want to believe that it treats defendants equally, regardless of race.
Data suggesting that defendants are being treated differently based on race
upset that view, and therefore may lead to change. Second, even if data are
not sufficiently “stark” to prove an equal protection violation, data
demonstrating disparate impact of laws may still make legislators worry
that the law is vulnerable to such challenges. For both of these reasons,
data that fall short of proving a selective prosecution claim still may result
in legislative action. A couple of examples demonstrate this point.
First, as discussed above, the mandatory minimum penalties set forth
in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provided for equal penalties for one
hundred times the amount of powder cocaine as crack cocaine. 106 Because
the overwhelming majority of defendants convicted of crack cocaine
offenses in federal court over the past twenty years have been AfricanAmerican, 107 and because crack cocaine penalties in federal court have
greatly exceeded the penalties for powder cocaine offenses, the percentage
of African Americans incarcerated in the federal Bureau of Prisons has
mushroomed over the past twenty-five years. 108
Although the data show that the low quantity threshold for mandatory
minimum crack penalties has had a disproportionate impact on African
Americans, equal protection challenges to these mandatory minimums

105
See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 983, 998 (2004) (describing hip-hop artists’ view of the criminal justice system as a
means of suppressing those who “rebel[] against the oppressive status quo”).
106
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
107
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 16 tbl.2-1 (2007) (setting out figures establishing that in 1992, 91.4% of
those convicted of crack offenses in federal court were African-American, in 2000, 84.7%
were African-American, and in 2006, 81.8% were African-American). In contrast, African
Americans constitute a relatively small percentage of those convicted of powder cocaine
offenses in federal court. See id. (setting forth data that African Americans constituted
between 27% and 30% of those convicted for powder cocaine offenses).
108
See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 22–29 (2007) (attributing disparities in
rates of black imprisonment in part to federal crack cocaine penalties); Note, Winning the
War on Drugs: A “Second Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1485,
1485–86 (2000) (noting that the “dramatic increase” in incarceration rates for AfricanAmerican males was caused by changes to crack cocaine sentencing laws).
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“have failed miserably in court.”109 Those same statistics, however, have
made headway with policymakers. In 2007, the United States Sentencing
Commission reduced the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines. 110 More recently, Congress has
acted to modify the mandatory minimums for crack offenses. On August 3,
2010, President Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
which changed the amounts of crack cocaine necessary to trigger five-year
mandatory minimum sentences from five grams to twenty-eight grams, and
for ten-year sentences from fifty grams to two hundred eighty grams. 111
This amendment reduces the disparity between the quantities of powder and
crack cocaine necessary to trigger mandatory minimum sentences from
100:1 to 18:1. And this change indisputably was the result of evidence that
the crack cocaine sentences were disproportionately affecting low-income
minority defendants.
Racially disproportionate sentencing statistics in drug cases also led to
reform of sentencing laws in Georgia. In 1987, the Georgia legislature
passed a two-strikes provision for drug offenses. 112 Under that provision, a
defendant convicted of a “second or subsequent” drug trafficking offense
was subject to a mandatory minimum life sentence if the state notified the
defendant prior to trial of its intent to seek the enhanced penalty. 113 By
May 1994, the state Board of Pardon and Parole’s records indicated that
98.4% of the defendants “serving life sentences for drug offenses . . . were
African-American, although African-Americans comprise only 27% of the
state’s population.” 114
In Stephens v. State, an African-American defendant sentenced to life
under the repeat offender provision used those statewide statistics, in
conjunction with evidence that all of the defendants serving life sentences
under that provision in Hall County (where Stephens was convicted) were
African-American, to argue that the statute was being enforced in a
discriminatory manner in violation of the equal protection guarantees of
both the United States Constitution and the Georgia constitution. Over a
strong dissent, a majority of the court concluded that Stephens had failed to

109
See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1298. Defendants have challenged the Act itself as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, id., and also have brought selective prosecution
claims against the government for the enforcement of the statute. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
110
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 70
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/may2007rf.pdf.
111
See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
112
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(d) (West 2009 & West Supp. 2010) (repealed).
113
See Mays v. State, 414 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 1992).
114
Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1995).
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establish an equal protection violation because he had not identified a
similarly situated white person in Hall County who could have been
prosecuted under the two-strikes law but was not. 115 The dissent found
Stephens’ statistical showing—establishing that an African-American
defendant in Georgia convicted of two or more drug offenses was 2,761%
more likely to receive a life sentence than a white defendant in Georgia
convicted of two or more drug offenses—sufficiently “stark” to require the
government, under a modified Batson framework, to provide a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to prosecute Stephens under the
repeat offender law. 116
Although Stephens failed to prevail in court, his case provided the
foundation for a change in the repeat offender law. Five months after the
case was decided, the Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial and
Ethnic Bias in the Court System issued a report citing the statistics set forth
in Stephens, and calling for a more detailed study broken down by judicial
circuit on the use of the repeat offender law. 117 Faced with these bleak
statistics, and the possibility of future successful equal protection
challenges if circuit-specific statistics were kept, the Georgia legislature
repealed the mandatory life sentence in two-strikes cases. 118
As these examples illustrate, data demonstrating unequal enforcement
of the laws, even in the absence of a finding that there has been a
constitutional violation, may lead to legislative reform. Thus, data
collection remains of critical importance to ensure that laws are enforced
fairly.

115

Id.
Id. at 568–69 (Benham, P.J., dissenting). When the slip opinion in the case was first
released, a majority of the Court concluded that the statistics presented by the defense were
“so grossly disproportionate . . . as to shock the conscience,” and therefore required the
Government to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its conduct. See Stephens
v. State, No. S94A1854, 1995 WL 116292 (Ga. Mar. 17, 1995), withdrawn, 456 S.E.2d 560
(Ga. 1995). The court’s slip opinion caused great consternation and prompted a scathing
letter from district attorneys across the state. See James P. Fleissner, Criminal Law and
Procedure: A Two-Year Survey, 48 MERCER L. REV. 219, 222 (1996). Less than two weeks
later, the court vacated the slip opinion and issued a new majority opinion concluding that
there was no violation of either the state or the federal Constitution. Justice Thompson, who
switched his vote between the two opinions, authored a concurring opinion noting that
although there was no constitutional violation, “only a true cynic can look at these statistics
and not be impressed that something is amiss.” Stephens, 456 S.E. 2d at 564 (Thompson, J.,
concurring specially). He therefore urged the Georgia legislature to step in and address the
problem. Id. at 565–66.
117
See Fleissner, supra note 116, at 230.
118
Id. at 224.
116
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA ON ECONOMIC STATUS OF DEFENDANTS
Among the various categories of data that can be kept on criminal
defendants, data regarding the economic status119 of the defendant may be
one of the most important to collect and analyze. This is true because the
data we have demonstrate that criminal defendants are disproportionately
poor. 120 Thus, the development of rational and effective criminal justice
policy requires both that we study this data to determine what programs
might be most effective and that we collect additional data that might
provide clues as to why poor people are so overrepresented in the criminal
justice system. In addition, in order to assure that laws are not being
applied discriminatorily against poor people, we need to analyze the data
we have and collect more complete data on those defendants. Before
turning to how data on income levels can be used, this Part explores the
limited data we currently have on the economic status (broadly defined) of
criminal defendants.
A. DATA CURRENTLY BEING COLLECTED ON ECONOMIC STATUS OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

Accurately estimating the income levels of individuals in the criminal
justice system presents challenges. As of now, no complete data are being
systematically collected on the income levels of all criminal defendants in
either the state or federal courts. Neither the Bureau of Justice Statistics’
database on criminal defendants in federal court121 nor its database on
felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five largest counties 122

119
For purposes of this Article, I use economic status, defined primarily by income level,
rather than the more robust concept of socioeconomic status, which can encompass many
other factors including occupation, education, and housing tenure. See Albert F. Osborn,
Assessing the Socio-Economic Status of Families, 21 SOCIOLOGY 429 (1987). Collecting
complete data on socioeconomic status of criminal defendants may provide a more accurate
picture than economic status data alone, but collecting economic status data is a necessary
first step. Accordingly, this Article primarily addresses the arguments for collecting
economic status data.
120
See infra Part III.A.
121
See FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS RES. CTR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA
DICTIONARY FOR DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED, http://fjsrc.urban.org/
datadictionary.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (describing all of the data variables collected
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
122
INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC. RESEARCH, VARIABLES FOR STATE
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS SERIES, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/
series/00079 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (follow “List all variables in this series” hyperlink)
(listing the data variables collected for the State Court Processing Statistics Series).
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collects data on the income level of criminal defendants. It also appears
that no state currently collects this data.123
Although complete data do not exist in any jurisdiction, we do have
some information regarding the economic status of some actors within the
criminal justice system. First, we have survey data documenting pre-arrest
income levels for a sample of inmates in correctional facilities. Second, we
have information regarding rates of appointment of counsel in felony cases
in federal court and in state courts in the largest counties. Finally, we have
data on educational levels of inmates in some state prisons and of
defendants convicted in federal court. As discussed below, each of these
datasets has limitations and jurisdictions ought to be collecting more
complete data, but these sources provide at least some information related
to economic status.
Beginning with data on income levels of incarcerated defendants, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics collects data on pre-arrest income levels in a
survey it administers to a sample of prisoners in state and federal prisons
and inmates in local jails. As discussed in Part III.B., infra, one problem
with this dataset is that the data on income level collected in these surveys
have not been comprehensively analyzed, but the data are being collected.
Every five to seven years, the Bureau of Justice Statistics conducts a survey
of a sample of inmates in state and federal prisons, and that survey includes
a question regarding the prisoner’s income level in the month prior to
arrest. 124 In 2004, approximately thirty-three percent of surveyed inmates
in state prisons reported that they had earned less than $800 in the month
preceding their arrest.125 That income would have put all of them at or
below the 2004 poverty threshold for a single person. 126 Because some
percentage of the prisoners reporting higher monthly incomes very likely
had dependents, 127 moreover, using $800 as the relevant cutoff probably
123

As discussed in Part IV, infra, Arkansas may start collecting this data, but at least as
of right now, it is not available.
124
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CODEBOOK FOR THE
SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 611–12 (2004),
available
at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archive2?study=4572&path=
NACJD&docsonly=yes (login and password required) [hereinafter BJS STATE AND FEDERAL
SURVEY]. The surveys were done in 1991, 1997, and 2004.
125
See id. The survey directs respondents to include income from both legal and illegal
sources.
126
The U.S. Census Bureau sets the poverty threshold for single people and families, and
it collects data on how many people in the United States fall below that threshold. In 2004,
the poverty threshold for a single person was $9,645. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY
THRESHOLDS (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/
threshld/thresh04.html.
127
There are a number of survey questions regarding the number of children the inmate
has and the number of people in the inmate’s household pre-arrest, and there also is a
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excludes a number of prisoners who were under the poverty threshold. 128 In
2004, approximately eleven percent of adults between the ages of eighteen
and sixty-four were in a household that was under the poverty threshold. 129
Thus, those below the poverty threshold were three times more likely to be
incarcerated in a state prison than the average person, and were four times
more likely than those above the poverty threshold.130
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also conducts a survey of jail inmates
that includes a question about monthly income prior to arrest,131 and the
statistics from the jail survey are even more striking. In the 2002 survey,
forty-seven percent of inmates reported that they earned less than $800 in
the month before their arrest.132 Those below the poverty threshold
therefore were more than four times more likely to be jailed than the
average person, and seven times more likely than those above the poverty
threshold. 133
question regarding whether the inmate was the primary financial support for any children
prior to arrest. See BJS STATE AND FEDERAL SURVEY, supra note 124, at 594–603. The
difficulty is that the survey does not ask how many children were financially dependent on
the inmate, whether any other household members (for instance spouses or parent) were
financially dependent on the inmate, or whether the household had any other source of
income. Thus, it is impossible to ascertain the percentage of inmates falling below the
poverty threshold.
128
The poverty thresholds vary depending on the size of the family and the ages of the
members of the household. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOW THE CENSUS BUREAU MEASURES
POVERTY (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/about/overview/
measure.html.
129
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and Unrelated
Individuals Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race: 2003—Below 100% of Poverty—
All Races, in CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 2004 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPLEMENT
(2004),
available
at
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032004/pov/
new01_100_01.htm. I use the census figures for adults age eighteen to sixty-four because
the correctional population figures capture adult inmates, and the vast majority of adult
inmates are over the age of eighteen and under the age of sixty-five.
130
Because the 11% of the population that is poor contributes 33% of the prison
population, a poor person’s chance of going to prison is three times greater than the average
person. By contrast, because the 89% of the population that is not poor constitutes only 67%
of the prison population, a non-poor person’s risk of going to prison is less than the average
person’s by a factor of 0.75:1. Thus, a poor person is four times (3/.75) more likely to be
imprisoned than a non-poor person.
131
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CODEBOOK FOR THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN
LOCAL JAILS, 2002 (2006), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/
archive2?study=4359&path=NACJD&docsonly=yes.
132
The jail survey includes both inmates who have been convicted and sentenced to a jail
term and pretrial defendants who are being detained pending trial. Because indigent
defendants are less likely to be able to post bond and therefore are more likely to be detained
pending trial, the sample of jail inmates may be poorer than criminal defendants generally.
133
Because the 11% of the population that is poor contributes 47% of the jail population,
a poor person’s chance of going to jail is 4.3 (47/11) times greater than the average person.
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Although the data collected in these surveys provide a useful starting
point, they are marked by two significant limitations. First, they reflect
only the income levels of defendants who were either convicted and
sentenced to prison or held in a local jail. As a result, the dataset excludes
all defendants who were not incarcerated. Second, because the Bureau of
Justice Statistics collects these data nationally, the data provide no
information on the income levels of defendants on a state-by-state basis. 134
Data on income levels of defendants therefore are sparse, but there are
a couple of proxies that can be used to estimate the economic status of
criminal defendants. Each of these proxies has limitations. They leave no
doubt, however, that the criminal justice system prosecutes and incarcerates
poor people at a much higher rate than non-poor people.
First, appointment of counsel serves as a proxy for indigence. Since
1963 when the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Constitution has required that states appoint counsel to defendants who are
“too poor to hire a lawyer.” 135 In 2004, appointed counsel represented
seventy-eight percent of felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five
largest counties. 136 The fact that appointed counsel represented these
defendants means that someone made a determination that these defendants
could not afford counsel.
The data on appointment of counsel have the advantage of capturing
the status of all criminal defendants who are prosecuted, not just those who
are convicted and sentenced to incarceration. Nonetheless, the data have
several limitations. The most significant of these is that the standard for
By contrast, because the 89% of the population that is not poor constitutes only 53% of the
jail population, a non-poor person’s risk of going to prison is less than the average person’s
by a factor of 0.6:1. Thus, a poor person is seven times (4.3/.6) more likely to be jailed than
a non-poor person.
134
Because of the way the sample for the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey was done,
“[s]tate, local, or other subnational estimates cannot be made.” Id. at 8.
As discussed below, see infra Part III.B, data regarding defendant demographics broken
down by state are particularly important both to the development of policy, which primarily
happens at the state level, and to ensuring that prosecutions, the majority of which happen in
state courts, are conducted fairly.
135
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants being prosecuted in state court
have a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel). At the time Gideon was decided, the
vast majority of states already provided counsel to indigent defendants charged with
felonies, but Gideon made clear that the right to counsel applied to all defendants charged
with felonies in state courts. Id. at 345. Since Gideon, the Court has held that the right to
counsel also applies in any case in which the court either imposes a sentence of
imprisonment, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), or suspends incarceration, see
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
136
This statistic comes from an analysis of data collected by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics as part of the State Court Processing Statistics Series, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR20281.
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appointment of counsel varies widely among jurisdictions,137 and
appointment of counsel therefore means different things in different places.
For instance, in Georgia, there is a presumption that felony defendants are
entitled to appointment of counsel if they earn less than 150% of the federal
poverty guidelines, 138 and a presumption that they are ineligible for
appointment of counsel if they earn over 150% of the federal poverty
guidelines. 139 Similarly, in Washington state, the statute provides very
specific guidelines for determining indigency, and counsel is generally
provided only if the defendant makes less than 125% of the federal poverty
guidelines. 140
In Alabama, by contrast, the statute establishes no income-based rules
or presumptions of any kind; instead the court must examine a broad array
of factors, including the net income of the defendant, the extent and
liquidity of assets, and the projected length and complexity of the legal
proceedings in determining whether the defendant qualifies for appointed
In Arkansas, courts have likewise emphasized that
counsel. 141
determinations of indigence should be made on a case-by-case basis. 142
Because there is no uniform standard for determining eligibility for
appointed counsel, it is difficult to make any assessment regarding the
income levels of those who use appointed counsel. 143
There is a second problem with using appointment of counsel as a
proxy for determining the income level of criminal defendants: our data are
limited to federal defendants and state felony defendants in forty of the
seventy-five largest counties. We have complete data on appointment rates
137
See Adam Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L. REV. 571, 572
(2005). The Supreme Court has never provided any guidance regarding how states should
determine whether a person is indigent for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel,
and jurisdictions therefore have adopted very different standards governing the inquiry. See
id. at 572 (“In the forty years since Gideon was decided, there has not been a single Supreme
Court case defining what makes a criminal defendant poor enough to be entitled to appointed
counsel.”).
138
The 2009 federal poverty guideline for a single person is $10,830, and for a family of
four is $22,050. See ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2009 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES (2010), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml.
139
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-8(b) (West 2009).
140
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010(1) (West 2002 & West Supp. 2010); WASH.
STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., UPDATE ON CRITERIA AND STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING AND
VERIFYING INDIGENCY 7 (2007), available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/Reports/
Other Reports/080228 10-22-07 Indigency Report - revised.pdf.
141
See ALA. CODE § 15-12-1 (1995).
142
See Hill v. State, 805 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1991).
143
In most jurisdictions, defendants are required either to file some sort of an affidavit in
order to establish their indigence or to respond to questions posed by the court on the
subject. See Gershowitz, supra note 137, at 580.
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in all federal cases, and data exist with regard to appointment rates for a
sample of defendants in state felony cases in the seventy-five largest
counties, 144 but beyond this, no useful data exist. Thus, there is no
information with regard to appointment rates in state felony cases in rural
areas. Nor is there information on appointment rates for defendants in
suburban counties, even though it is far from clear that the appointment
rates in suburban counties even loosely track those rates in more urban
settings. 145 There is, moreover, no data of any sort regarding appointment
of counsel in state misdemeanor cases, despite the fact that appointment of
counsel in felony cases may well differ from the appointment rate in
misdemeanor cases. 146
Finally, using appointment of counsel as a proxy for the income level
of defendants may be misleading because some defendants become indigent
and eligible for the appointment of counsel precisely because they are
charged with a criminal offense. If a defendant is held without bail pending
trial (or is held because he cannot afford bail) then he very likely will lose
his employment. Unless such a defendant has saved money or has some
assets, he will be unable to afford counsel and likely will be found eligible
for court-appointed counsel. These “post-arrest indigents,” however, stand
in very different shoes from “pre-arrest indigents,” primarily because the
former group is indigent only as a result of the fact that the criminal justice
system itself has removed them from self-sufficiency and gainful
employment.
Despite these complexities, it remains significant that available data
indicate that almost eighty percent of felony defendants in state courts in
the seventy-five largest counties have court-appointed representation.
Using incomes of less than 150% of the federal poverty guidelines as a
benchmark for appointment of counsel,147 in 2008, nineteen percent of
Americans between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four were part of a

144
See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 4 (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (describing collection of data for
database).
145
Of course, some urban counties include suburbs within the county limits. For
instance, Cook County, Illinois, includes Northbrook, IL, with a median household income
of $95,665, Wilmette, IL, with a median income of $106,773, and the city of Chicago, with a
median income of $38,625. See RECORD INFO. SERVS., COOK COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES AND
DEMOGRAPHICS (2010), available at http://www.public-record.com/content/municipalities/
cook/index.asp.
146
See Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461, 489–90 (2007) (reporting that in federal court, of defendants for whom type of
counsel was reported, only twenty-five percent had appointed counsel).
147
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-8(b) (West 2003 & West Supp. 2010).
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household that made less than that amount.148 In other words, less than a
fifth of the population was charged with seventy-eight percent of the
felonies in criminal cases across the country. If one calculates the risk of
being charged with a crime, those with incomes of less than 150% of the
federal poverty guidelines have a risk of being charged with a felony about
four times greater than the average person and about fifteen times greater
than the risk for those above the 150% marker. 149
Educational level provides another rough proxy for economic status.
Unfortunately, with the exception of the Massachusetts Department of
Correction and the South Carolina Department of Corrections, state systems
do not publish data on the educational level of criminal defendants.150 In
the federal system, the United States Sentencing Commission collects data
on the education level of defendants convicted in federal court. According
to that data, in 2006, 48.9% of convicted offenders had less than a high
school diploma. 151 By contrast, the Census Bureau reported that in April
2000, only twenty percent of the overall United States population lacked a
high school degree. 152 Again, however, the usefulness of these data is
somewhat limited.153 First, and most obviously, education level correlates
148

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POV01: Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and
Unrelated Individuals Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race: 2008, in CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY: 2009 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (2009), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/pov/new01_150_01.htm. In 1996,
the rate was 23.5%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY tbl.2 (1996),
available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/031996/pov/2_001.htm.
149
Seventy-eight percent of the cases involved the 19% of the population below the
150% marker; thus the chance of a person under that marker being charged with a felony
was a little over four times (78/19) greater than the risk for an average person. By contrast,
the risk that a person over that marker would be charged with a felony was almost four times
less likely than an average person to be charged with a felony (22/81 or .27). As a result, the
chance of a person below the marker being charged with a felony is fifteen times greater
(4.1/.27) than the risk for a person above the marker.
150
The Massachusetts Department of Correction data shows that in 2009, 66% of the
DOC population reported completing eleventh grade or less. See MASS. DEP’T OF CORR.,
JANUARY 1, 2009 INMATE STATISTICS v (2009), http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/
research_reports/Jan_1_population/112009.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2009 INMATE STATISTICS].
Similarly, in 2009, 58% of South Carolina inmates reported that they did not have either a
high school diploma or a GED. See S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., PROFILE OF INMATES IN
INSTITUTIONAL COUNT AS OF JUNE 30, 2009, at 1 (2009), http://www.doc.sc.gov/
research/InmatePopulationStats/ASOF_InstitutionalCount Profile_FY09.pdf.
151
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006 tbl.4.4 (2006),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf
[hereinafter
FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006].
152
See KURT J. BAUMAN & NIKKI L. GRAF, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 2000, at 1 (2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf.
153
The same Bureau of Justice Statistics survey that captures data on the income level of
inmates in federal and state prisons and in local jails, see BJS STATE AND FEDERAL SURVEY,
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only in a general way with income level. Second, patterns shown in federal
cases may tell us little about what occurs in state systems. Indeed, the
federal data may well overestimate the education level of inmates as a
whole, because the statistics from Massachusetts indicate that sixty-six
percent of their inmates, 154 as opposed to forty-nine percent of federal
inmates, have less than a high school diploma. Finally, because federal data
are collected only by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, we have no data on
the educational level of defendants who are not convicted.
We have, then, sufficient data to establish that low-income people
constitute a disproportionate percentage of criminal defendants. Based on
this data, however, we do not—and cannot—know how disproportionate
that percentage is in general in the state system or in individual states. And
without any data as to the level of disproportionality, it is particularly
difficult to examine the reasons why any level of disproportion exists.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING AND CONSIDERING DATA ON
INCOME LEVEL OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

Just as collecting data on the race, mental health status, and drug
addiction of criminal defendants has been important for the implementation
of rational criminal justice policy and for ensuring that laws are enforced in
an evenhanded way, data collection on income levels of criminal defendants
is of paramount importance. In order to develop the most successful and
cost-effective solutions for the crime problems we face, we need to target
criminal justice programs towards the people most likely to be defendants.
Based on the data we have, the overrepresentation of poor people exceeds
the overrepresentation of any other definable group with the exception of
drug-dependent and mentally ill defendants.155 At least some crimereduction programs therefore need to be targeted towards poor people.
Policymakers, however, have all but ignored the data that exist on the

supra note 124, also collects data on the educational level of the inmates in those
institutions. Those data, however, are subject to the same limitations as the data for the
income levels and therefore are not discussed separately here.
154
See MASS. 2009 INMATE STATISTICS, supra note 150, at v.
155
For instance, African Americans are significantly overrepresented in the prison
population. In 2008, approximately 33% of inmates in state and federal prison were AfricanAmerican. See WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER C. WEST, & MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008, at 2 tbl.1 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1763. That same year, approximately
fourteen percent of the American population was African-American. Thus, African
Americans were approximately three times more likely to be prisoners than non-African
Americans. While that ratio is high, the overrepresentation of poor people is even higher,
with poor people being more than four times more likely to be in state prison than non-poor
people. See supra Part III.A.
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overrepresentation of poor people and have not called for the collection of
any additional data.156 Thus, the data we currently have on the economic
status of defendants and the income levels of prisoners need to be carefully
analyzed, and we need to collect additional data to fill the gaps in the data.
1. Using Data on Economic Status to Develop Rational
Criminal Justice Policy
Low-income people constitute a large percentage of those prosecuted
and incarcerated in the criminal justice system. That fact suggests that
criminal justice policymakers should focus on solutions targeted
specifically at those who are poor. Unfortunately, with one possible
exception discussed below, 157 this has not happened. This is so for a couple
of reasons. First, although some data related to economic status have been
collected, very little analysis has been done of that raw data. Second, most
of the data being collected cannot be broken down by state and so is not
particularly useful for state legislators. Because it is at the state level that
most of these policies and programs need to be developed, states probably
need to begin collecting data on the income levels of defendants prosecuted
in their courts so that they can analyze, among other things, the types of
offenses poor defendants, as compared with wealthier defendants, are
committing and the rates of recidivism of poor defendants as compared with
the recidivism rates of non-poor defendants. This section first will examine
the ways in which the federal government should be using the existing data
and then will turn to the ways in which states should consider collecting
data in order to develop effective programs targeted towards low-income
defendants.
The existing databases compile a wealth of survey data on inmates in
state and federal prisons and in local jails, and provide some data on the
cases of felony defendants represented by court-appointed counsel. The
problem is that although the raw data are available online, the assembled
information cannot speak for itself; the data need to be analyzed before we
can get any information about the economic status of defendants.
Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the entity that provides most
of the reports from data it collects, has not made information on the income
levels of inmates from the surveys readily accessible. Indeed, the last time
a Bureau of Justice Statistics report included data on income levels of
prisoners from the survey data described above dates back to the 1991

156
157

As discussed in Part IV, infra, Arkansas is the one exception.
See infra notes 162–168 and accompanying text.
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survey. 158 Since then, the few publications with any data on income levels
of prisoners report that information only in association with some other
variable, making it very difficult to draw conclusions about the economic
status of prisoners from those reports. 159
Even a basic analysis of that data could lead to more involvement by
the federal government in developing crime reduction strategies targeted
towards low-income offenders.
As discussed above, the federal
government played a critical role in the development of drug treatment
courts and mental health courts. And the federal government’s decision to
fund those initiatives was driven in large part by the data establishing the
extent of the criminal justice system’s problems with drug-addicted and
mentally ill defendants. While the government’s support of those programs
certainly was warranted, the data make clear that the percentage of poor
felony defendants—however the term “poor” might be defined—in state
courts approaches that of drug-addicted defendants, 160 and is significantly
higher than that of mentally ill defendants. 161
Thus, there certainly are enough data for the federal government to
support the development of state programs targeted towards low-income
defendants in the way that it has with both drug courts and mental health
courts. Thus far, however, the federal government has only provided one
set of funding designed to reduce recidivism rates by comprehensively
addressing the needs, including in the areas of employment and education,
of offenders reentering communities after prison terms. Efforts to address
prisoner reentry began with the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry
Initiative (SVORI), a collaboration among the Departments of Justice,
Labor, Education, Housing and Urban Development, and Health and
Human Services to fund initiatives in the states to ease the reentry of
158
ALLEN BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON
INMATES, 1991, at 3 (1993), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=1073 (reporting income levels of inmates in the year before arrest).
159
See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 10 (2003) (reporting income data on state
prisoners broken down by highest level of education reported by the prisoner).
160
In 2004, 53% of state prisoners met the DSM-IV criteria for drug dependence or
abuse. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS,
2004, at 1 (2006).
161
A survey of prison and jail inmates found that at midyear 2005, 24% of state prison
inmates had a recent history of mental health problems (defined as being diagnosed by a
mental health professional with a mental disorder, being hospitalized overnight because of a
mental health problem, being prescribed medication, or receiving therapy from a mental
health professional). See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 2 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
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prisoners back into society and to prevent recidivism. 162 Perhaps not
surprisingly, the development of SVORI was spurred by data documenting
recidivism rates and barriers to successful reentry. In 2002, SVORI
awarded a number of three-year grants totaling $139 million to fund state
efforts to provide comprehensive services—including drug treatment,
educational opportunities, job training, and mental health services—to
prisoners prior to and after their release. 163 In addition to providing funding
to the states to implement these programs, the SVORI also funded
evaluations of the programs created by the states.164
Citing much of the data that led to the creation of SVORI—including
that two-thirds of released state prisoners are expected to be rearrested for a
new offense within three years of release, that 70% of prisoners function at
the lowest literacy levels 165 and only 32% of state prison inmates have a
high school diploma, 166 that a significant percentage of state prisoners were
not working prior to entry into prison, 167 and that one year after release, up
to 60% of former inmates are not employed 168—Congress enacted the
Second Chance Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism
Prevention. 169 The Act authorizes grants, administered through the
Department of Justice, to programs providing services to prisoners that are
designed to prevent substance abuse and to facilitate reentry into the
community, including by providing educational, literacy, vocational, and
job placement services while the offender is still in prison and providing
supervision and services when the offender is released.170 The Act also
authorizes up to $10 million per year for research on juvenile and adult
offender reentry. 171 As a result of the funding through these two programs,
a number of jurisdictions have developed reentry programs. Unfortunately,
in the only evaluative study of these reentry programs, although SVORI

162
See PAMELA K. LATTIMORE, ET AL., NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF SVORI: SERIOUS AND
VIOLENT OFFENDER REENTRY INITIATIVE 2 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/
url.cfm?ID=1000692 [hereinafter NATIONAL PORTRAIT].
163
See id. at 18.
164
See id. at 11–13; PAMELA LATTIMORE & CHRISTY A. VISHER, THE MULTI-SITE
EVALUATION OF THE SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENDER REENTRY INITIATIVE (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412075 [hereinafter MULTI-SITE EVALUATION].
165
Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(b)(14), 122 Stat. 657, 660
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
166
§ 3(b)(15).
167
§ 3(b)(16).
168
§ 3(b)(18).
169
See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(b)(5), 122 Stat. 657, 659–
60 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
170
§ 101(1)–(2).
171
§ 245.
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participants reported that they received services at a higher rate than nonSVORI participants, the evidence tracking recidivism rates of participants
in these programs shows at most only a modest decrease in recidivism as
compared to non-participants. 172
Part of the explanation for this outcome could lie in the fact that
SVORI participants were “high-risk offenders who had extensive criminal
and substance abuse histories, low levels of education and employment
skills, and families and peers who were substance and criminal justice
system involved.” 173 Indeed, on average, the male participants had first
been arrested at age sixteen and had been arrested more than twelve times,
and the female participants had first been arrested at age nineteen and had
been arrested more than ten times. 174 Despite its lack of measurable success
in reducing recidivism rates, the Initiative was laudable both for its efforts
to address prisoner reentry in a comprehensive way and for its commitment
to measuring outcomes. SVORI was not, however, a program specifically
designed to address the income disparity of inmates in the prisons. Instead,
it targeted a particularly high-risk group of serious offenders and tried to
address all of their issues, from drug addiction to mental illness to economic
challenges.
The only other federal program that seeks to reduce recidivism rates by
improving the economic situation of newly released convicted felons
provides a federal tax credit to employers who hire ex-felons within a year
of their release from imprisonment or their conviction, whichever is later. 175
In theory, this tax credit should provide a significant incentive for
employers to hire ex-felons, particularly in lower-wage jobs, that offsets
some of the disincentive to hiring applicants with convictions on their
records. It is not at all clear, however, that the program is having such an
effect. Indeed, the government does not appear to have tried to measure the
effect of this particular tax credit in any way, 176 so it is difficult to even

172

See MULTI-SITE EVALUATION, supra note 164, at 86 (documenting relatively minimal
effects of SVORI program on recidivism rates over a two-year period).
173
See id. at ES-8.
174
Id.
175
See 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
176
Although the Internal Revenue Service ultimately grants the tax credit, the
Department of Labor is charged with primary operation of the program. The only data
available from the Department of Labor include the total number of certifications received
for all of the groups covered under the statute. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Work Opportunity
Tax Credit (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.doleta.gov/business/Incentives/opptax/ (stating that
in fiscal year 2008, 691,421 certifications were issued by state workforce agencies). The
statute, however, covers a number of groups, including certain veterans, those receiving
benefits from SSI or other designated public assistance, and certain residents of designated
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know the extent to which employers are participating in the program. In
sum, the federal government’s efforts to address criminal justice system
issues related to economic status have been both fragmented and modest.
The states have also fallen short in efforts to take account of economic
status in the operation of their criminal justice systems. As discussed in
Part III.A, very little state-specific data are currently being collected
regarding the economic status of criminal defendants. Perhaps as a result,
states have done very little to focus on the problem. Like the federal
government, a few states have implemented programs designed to reduce
recidivism by assisting ex-offenders with getting jobs. For instance, Illinois
has enacted a state tax credit similar to the federal credit,177 and several
states have passed “Ban the Box” legislation, which bars employers from
asking about prior convictions on job applications.178 These Ban the Box
statutes are limited in their scope—the Minnesota and New Mexico statutes
cover only public employers, and the Hawaii law, while purporting to cover
all employers, exempts many employers, including the state and any of its
branches or agencies, counties, many financial institutions, and private
schools 179—but they at least give those with prior convictions on their
record a better opportunity to get a foot in the employment door.180
empowerment or enterprise zones. See 26 U.S.C. § 51(d)(1) (2006). Thus, it is impossible
to assess the extent to which the program is being used specifically to benefit ex-felons.
177
See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (West Supp. 2010) (providing a tax credit of up
to $600 for each qualifying ex-offender that an employer hires and defining a qualifying exoffender as an offender who has served time in an Illinois adult correctional center and was
hired within one year of release from confinement).
178
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting all employers
from inquiring about or considering conviction records until after the potential employee has
been given a conditional offer of employment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.021 (West 2004 &
West Supp. 2010) (prohibiting public employers from asking potential employees about
criminal records until after the potential employee has been selected for an interview); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting state employers from making any
inquiry into prior convictions on initial applications for employment and allowing
consideration of conviction only after applicant has “been selected as a finalist for the
position”).
179
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(d).
180
The EEOC has concluded that an absolute bar on employment of any individual with
a criminal conviction on his record violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2010). See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html
[hereinafter EEOC POLICY STATEMENT]. See also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d.
1290, 1293–99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that a blanket policy of refusing employment to
anyone with a conviction on his record had a disparate impact on African Americans and
could not show that such policy was job-related and consistent with business necessity). In
deciding whether or not to hire a person with a criminal conviction on his record, the
employer therefore, should consider three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense;
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Although programs aimed at removing the barriers to employment
faced by ex-offenders may help reduce recidivism, given the high rates of
poverty and low rates of education among ex-offenders, it is unlikely that
these programs alone will have much impact on overall crime rates. This is
an area in which data could provide some guidance. If the data were to
show that first-time offenders are as likely to be poor at the time of their
arrest as are repeat offenders, this information would suggest that the felony
conviction is not the primary barrier to gainful employment. Thus, states
might find that tax incentives and Ban the Box initiatives are less effective
means of reducing recidivism than other programs. The question, of
course, is what other programs might be effective.
One possibility would involve adopting a therapeutic jurisprudence
model court designed to divert defendants charged with certain types of
offenses into a program that helps them find jobs and stable housing
arrangements, while promoting their active participation in the life of the
community. The therapeutic jurisprudence model—which encompasses
both drug courts and mental health courts—advocates for the law as a
therapeutic agent that enhances the physical or psychological well-being of
individuals. 181 Drug courts, for instance, seek to use the power of the
criminal law to enhance the psychological well-being of the participant by
helping that person understand the nature and effects of addiction. 182 If
poverty in some way psychologically reduces the disincentive to
committing crime—for instance, by disconnecting the person from the
community ties that ordinarily provide an incentive to engage in lawful
behavior—addressing those disconnections through a diversionary court
may reduce crime rates. 183
Of course, the types of offenses that should be diverted will depend on
what the data show. But if the data show a correlation between low income
(2) the length of time since the potential employee’s conviction or release from confinement;
and (3) the nature of the job sought. See EEOC POLICY STATEMENT, supra.
Given this law under Title VII, the legislation passed in Minnesota, Hawaii, and New
Mexico assists ex-offenders seeking jobs in a couple of ways. First, the statutes prohibit
covered employers from asking questions about prior convictions on initial job applications.
Once an employer has made the decision to advance the application to the interview stage or
has conditionally decided to hire the applicant, the employer has had the opportunity to
consider the applicant without regard to his past record, making it more probable that the
applicant will be hired even in spite of the later notification of the prior conviction. Second,
if the applicant’s prior conviction is not particularly related to the expected job duties of the
position and the applicant ultimately is not hired, he has a much stronger, and more
complete, record that the employer has violated Title VII.
181
See WINICK & WEXLER, supra note 58, at 7–9.
182
Id.
183
Cf. Butler, supra note 105, at 998 (suggesting that in the hip-hop culture, prison and
punishment have lost their stigmatic effect).
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levels and the commission of certain offenses—for instance, shoplifting and
petty theft—it may make sense to divert these cases so as to prevent
recidivism by resolving the issue that led to the criminal behavior.184 Other
offenses that correlate with income level—in particular drug distribution—
may also fit well into a therapeutic justice initiative. In general, courts have
been reluctant to address head-on the economic nature of drug distribution,
instead trying to shuttle defendants into programs like drug courts that do
not address their underlying needs. Indeed, some critics of drug courts have
pointed to the fact that, at least in some jurisdictions, many drug traffickers
are being diverted into drug courts even if they show few signs of
addiction. 185 Part of the reason that these defendants are diverted into drug
courts is that judges are reluctant to impose the sentences mandated by
harsh drug laws, while prosecutors are unwilling to dismiss the cases
altogether. 186 The difficulty with placing non-addicted defendants into
addiction-based drug court programs is self-evident. The real problem is
that many street-level drug dealers come from impoverished backgrounds,
and selling drugs offers a quick way to make significant amounts of money.
Helping those defendants find and take advantage of legal work options is
much more likely to reduce recidivism than providing them with addiction
counseling that they do not need.
In short, a rational criminal justice policy seeking to reduce crime and
recidivism rates must recognize that a significant percentage of those who
are charged with and convicted of crimes are poor, and it must develop
programs to reduce criminal activity among the poor. The development of
those programs requires reliable data, both to justify funding and to help
determine what programs might be most effective. Finally, data on the
operation of any programs are necessary so that the success of the programs
can be measured. Such steps will enable modification of programs to
maximize their effectiveness and replication of effective programs.

184

These types of crimes are not as serious as those that were included within the SVORI
study. See NATIONAL PORTRAIT, supra note 162. The severity of the charged offense may
well be one factor that states would want to consider in determining what offenses the
alternative court would encompass.
185
See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 794–98
(2008) (noting that 95% of the drug court participants in the Bronx Drug Court and 90% of
the defendants in the Brooklyn drug court are charged with drug dealing, rather than drug
possession).
186
Id.
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2. The Importance of Data on Economic Status for
Ensuring Equal Treatment
Data on the income levels of defendants also provide a means of
determining whether our laws are being enforced equally, without regard to
either race or class. The data we currently have demonstrates that poor
people are disproportionately represented among those prosecuted in
criminal cases. 187 Without proper data, it is impossible to ascertain whether
this overrepresentation is attributable to a higher rate of committing crimes
among poor people or to unequal enforcement of the criminal laws.
Before turning to the types of data we need to have in order to properly
assess this issue, a word on the remedy for unequal enforcement of statutes
against poor people is in order. To date, the Supreme Court has never held
that socioeconomic class is a protected class for purposes of analyzing
equal protection claims. Presumably, then, even if there were data
establishing discriminatory enforcement, a low-income defendant might
well have no cognizable selective prosecution claim. At the least, then, the
collection of data on economic status will provide less help in asserting
selective prosecution claims than similar data based on race or sex.
That fact notwithstanding, data on economic status still are critical to
preventing unequal enforcement of statutes against lower-income
defendants. As discussed above, the constitutional remedy for selective
prosecution of racial minorities has provided virtually no relief for
individual defendants.188 Even in the absence of constitutional claims,
however, data on the unequal enforcement of statutes can and sometimes
does lead to legislative reform.
The data on education levels of defendants gives at least some reason
to question whether the government enforces criminal laws equally across
economic classes. In federal court, only 30.5% of those with less than a
high school diploma were released prior to trial, while 77% of defendants
with a college degree were released.189 Because the Bail Reform Act
prohibits judicial officers from “impos[ing] a financial condition that results
in the pretrial detention of a person,”190 the ability to post bail should not
account for this difference. Of course, it could be that the nature of the
crime charged varies with the educational background of the defendant.
But these data should give us pause.

187
See supra Part III.A. Because our data are incomplete, we do not know the extent to
which poor people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, but it is safe to say that
there is at least some overrepresentation.
188
See supra Part II.B.
189
See FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006, supra note 151, at tbl.3.2.
190
See 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(2) (2006).
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For lower-level offenses, the effect of poverty may be most apparent.
As discussed above, inmates in local jails are significantly poorer than
inmates in state and federal prisons.191 That could mean one of two things:
Either poor people commit a greater percentage of low-level crimes than
more serious offenses, or poor people are more likely to be sentenced to
incarceration for relatively minor offenses than wealthier people. 192 The
only way to determine which of the reasons results in the disparity is to
examine data on offense levels and sentencing, as well as data on the
convictions of poor people in local jails. If the data support the latter
explanation, then jurisdictions may well want to examine sentencing
practices for misdemeanor and low-level felony offenses to promote fair
and nondiscriminatory sentencing.
Finally, data might show significant income disparities among those
charged with particular offenses, while also demonstrating that rates of
offending do not explain the disparity. If so, there is a strong basis for
concluding that over-enforcement of certain criminal laws in low-income
areas is occurring. Enforcement of drug possession laws provides a rich
area for study along these lines, at least in part because the federal
government has some data on the profiles of drug users. If the data
establish that poor people are significantly overrepresented among those
prosecuted under statutes outlawing controlled substance possession, one
would then want to turn to the extent to which drug use is primarily a lowincome issue. According to a report prepared by the federal government in
2002, current illicit drug use is somewhat higher among adults with less
than a high school education (7.6%) than adults with a college education
(4.3%). 193 But adults with a college education also were more likely to
have used drugs in their lifetimes (47.2%) than adults who had not
completed high school (32%). 194 Those facts suggest that while drug use
may be occurring at slightly higher rates in low-income areas than in
wealthier neighborhoods, drug use is prevalent across the country. Thus, if
low-income people are being prosecuted or are incarcerated or both for drug
possession at overwhelmingly higher rates than non-poor people, there may
191

See supra Part III.A. In general, those incarcerated in local jails have been convicted
of lower level offenses than those sentenced to prison.
192
For more serious crimes, the sentencing guidelines now in operation in many states
have mitigated some of the differences in sentencing based on socioeconomic class. See
Frase, supra note 21, at 177 (noting that evaluations have indicated that Minnesota’s
sentencing guidelines have “largely . . . eliminated” race, gender, and class biases as “direct
causes of sentencing disparity”).
193
See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2001
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 20 (2002), available at
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k1nhsda/vol1/toc.htm.
194
Id.
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be issues with unequal enforcement of the drug laws. Again, however,
without the collection and analysis of data on the economic status of
defendants in the criminal justice system, we cannot know whether unequal
enforcement is occurring.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Rational criminal justice policy and assurances of equal enforcement
of laws both require the collection and analysis of data on the economic
status of criminal defendants. In particular, researchers should collect and
analyze economic status data on defendants in a database that also includes,
at the very least, the charges against the defendant, sentencing data, and
criminal history.
Much of this data already exists for prisoners in state and federal
prisons and inmates in local jails. 195 But the existing data need to be
analyzed much more thoroughly. As an initial matter, we need to determine
exactly what percentage of the inmate population is poor. That may require
more detailed analysis, not just of the pre-arrest monthly income of each
inmate but also of the number of dependents and the household income.
Data also should be parsed to determine what types of crimes poor people
commit and whether the breakdown of those crimes mirrors the types of
crimes committed by non-poor defendants. If poor people are convicted of
different crimes than non-poor people, more research needs to be done to
determine why that is the case so that policy proposals can incorporate that
data.
If poor people are convicted of the same types of crimes as non-poor
people and are just generally overrepresented among all types of crimes, the
policy responses may well differ because the overrepresentation of poor
people may result from a factor other than economic need. Regardless what
the data show about the breakdown of offenses, any analysis should try to
ascertain whether the overrepresentation of poor people in the system is the
result of discrimination against the poor or the result of a higher rate of
offending. For at least some crimes, we have rough data regarding the
demographic profile of those who engage in criminal behavior.196 If that
profile differs significantly from the profile of those who are imprisoned for
those offenses, lawmakers may need to examine the ways in which those
laws are being enforced at the arrest level, prosecution level, and trial level.
Recidivism rates also provide fertile ground for analysis to assist
policymakers. In particular, it would be helpful to know whether repeat

195
196

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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offenders are more likely to be poor than first offenders, and if so, the
magnitude of that difference.
A key purpose of collecting data of this kind is to spur the
development of programs that address in a nuanced way the issue of the
overrepresentation of low-income people in the criminal justice system.
Most of these programs will be implemented, if at all, at the state level. Yet
existing datasets—provided primarily by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
survey data—give us only a broad nationwide overview. This is the case
even though the profile of poor people in different states varies greatly,
depending on, among other things, whether the state is predominately rural
or urban. In addition, the substantive criminal laws and sentencing
provisions, as well as enforcement strategies, differ significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
For all of these reasons, states need to collect and analyze their own
data so that they can develop programs adapted to their local conditions.
There are, of course, challenges to collecting these data, particularly at the
pretrial stage of the case. Once the defendant has been convicted and
sentenced, data collection is less complicated, since prisons and jails in
many jurisdictions already gather a great deal of information from inmates.
In particular, in order to determine the appropriate security level for
inmates, many correctional facilities secure information regarding the
inmate’s criminal history, the charges on which he was convicted, and the
economic background of the inmate, including educational level.197 None
of these data, however, are available in a usable form, either because the
state has not compiled the information into a database or because it has not
made the database available. As discussed above, Massachusetts and South
Carolina are the only jurisdictions that collect and make available data on
the educational background of inmates, along with criminal history and
other relevant data. 198 States need to establish systems for compiling the
information they collect into a single database that can be analyzed to
provide more useful information to policymakers. 199
Collection of data from criminal defendants who have been charged
but not convicted presents additional challenges. First, to the extent that
any of the information is incriminating, criminal defendants may have a
197
See, e.g., Assigning Inmates to Prison, N.C. DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/DOP/custody.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (noting that in order
to determine security classifications, “[p]rison classification specialists develop an individual
profile of each inmate that includes the offender’s crime, social background, education, job
skills and work history, health, and criminal record, including prior prison sentences”).
198
See supra Part III.A.
199
Grants from the Bureau of Justice Assistance could prove critical to the ability of
states to undertake this task.
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Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide it. 200 For instance, if a
defendant has been earning income through illegal means and is charged for
that illegal conduct, requiring her to report her income may tend to
incriminate her. One solution might be to permit pretrial defendants to
refuse to answer questions that might incriminate them. Although creating
such an exemption will result in missing data, the exemption should apply
to only a small percentage of defendants and the datasets likely still will be
large.
States also must determine who should be responsible for collecting
data from pretrial defendants. At the pretrial stage, a number of different
institutional actors interact with defendants, including police officers,
prosecutors, courts, and defense lawyers, but pretrial services agencies may
be the most logical choice to collect these data. In many jurisdictions,
pretrial services agencies collect information from defendants in order to
assist the judge in deciding whether to release the defendant prior to trial, 201
and that information often includes, among other things, defendants’
employment history. 202 In jurisdictions that rely heavily on pretrial service
agency reports, the gathering of data by these agencies makes sense. Of
course, these data would not include the end result of the case—that is,
whether the defendant was convicted and, if so, the sentence imposed.
Nonetheless, these data would provide a very helpful profile of those
charged in the criminal justice system.
Other potential sources for data on pretrial defendants are the court
system itself and public defender offices. As discussed above, the rules for
determining eligibility for court-appointed counsel vary by jurisdiction, 203
but in every jurisdiction, either someone within the court system or
someone from the public defender’s office collects information from all
200
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defendants seeking court-appointed counsel, including the charges they are
facing, employment status, and income level. To be sure, this information
is not collected from those who retain counsel, so any database compiled
from these data would be incomplete. It would, however, provide some
information regarding the income levels of defendants who have appointed
counsel, and if this information were collected and maintained by the court,
it could be part of a database that also includes the outcomes of cases.
The one other stage at which data are collected is at sentencing,
particularly in jurisdictions that have sentencing commissions. In at least
some of these jurisdictions, the sentencing commission is specifically
charged with collecting and analyzing data about defendants, the crimes
they committed, and the sentences they receive. 204 In such states, it would
impose little added burden to also require the collection and compilation of
data on the education level of the defendant, pre-arrest income level, and
number of dependents.
The critical point is that states need to make data collection a priority,
designating specific actors to collect and compile data on defendants and
then funding efforts to do so. Once the data have been collected, there are a
number of entities—including the Bureau of Justice Statistics, academics,
and non-profit organizations—that can assist with analyzing the data so that
policymakers have the critical information they need to create programs that
will reduce crime.
It appears that Arkansas is already on the path to developing just such
a plan for the collection and analysis of data. In 2009, the state enacted
legislation creating a Criminal Justice Task Force, which was charged with
examining information about crime victims and criminal defendants,
including information about their age, gender, race, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic status. 205 The legislature directed the task force to
determine, among other things, the effectiveness of current criminal
penalties in deterring future crime, 206 the cost of sentences, 207 and the risk
that criminal laws are being administered unequally based on the race,
gender, age, or socioeconomic status of either the defendant or the
victim. 208 The legislation also directs the task force to “[d]etermine the
adequacy of current data systems to record and retrieve data that will enable
ongoing monitoring of the criminal justice system to determine if it is
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functioning fairly and equitably.” 209 Because Arkansas currently does not
collect most of the data described by the legislature, the task force will have
to analyze the best way to collect these data and make a proposal to the
legislature to implement that plan.
In sum, while most states do not appear to be collecting data on the
economic status of people within the criminal justice system, a few states
appear to be moving in that direction. States need to understand that the
task is not as large as it might at first seem. Some actors within the criminal
justice system—most notably corrections department and pretrial services
agencies—already gather much data from defendants, so the primary
mechanism that needs to be instituted involves: (1) rounding out the scope
of the information gathered from each defendant and (2) compiling and
preserving the data that are collected. For every state, the potential
advantage of assembling such data involves nothing less than building a
criminal justice system that works in the most effective way possible. The
benefits of taking these modest steps therefore should be well worth the
cost.
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system needs data on economic status both in
order to develop rational policy and in order to ensure equal treatment.
Some data already are being collected, and we need to begin the process of
analyzing that data. States also, however, need to begin collecting data on
economic status in their own jurisdictions so that they have more specific
data from which to develop sound laws and policies. Agencies in some
states already collect this data, and other states can easily put in place
similar data collection programs. All states must also take steps to compile
the information they do collect into usable databases. Most importantly,
once the data have been collected and analyzed, that analysis needs to be
used to focus attention on economic status, just as data were used to focus
attention on drug addiction and mental illness. The development of
programs targeted at poor people has the potential to reduce crime rates
significantly, but that potential can only be realized if policymakers focus
on the issue and develop coherent policy responses.
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